HISTORY 235 – GERMAN HISTORY 1871 TO THE PRESENT
PRESENTATION 2:
In what way was the situation in the late 1980s more
conducive to revolution than that in the early 1950s?
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It is impossible to analyse German
partition in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and then the reunification process
that started in the late 1980s - though to complete political and economic
reunification on October 3 1990, without taking into account the Cold War.
Germany, in many ways, became a puppet for the two superpowers (the USA and
USSR) as they fought an ideological war throughout Europe and the world.
Therefore, the link between a decline of the Cold War in the late 1980s and
German reunification is absolutely critical, and goes a long way towards
explaining why Germany was not allowed to reunify in the 1950s, but was
encouraged by the late 1980s. The change in attitude by the Soviet Union, from
that of active support in the 1950s to ‘non-interference’ under Gorbachev, is
also essential when comparing the two periods where the idea of reunification
was proposed. Eventually what did happen in 1990 was effectively a take-over of
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by the German Federal Republic (GFR), a
scenario that was completely unacceptable to Stalin in the early 1950s.
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By the end of
World War II Germany had been completely destroyed militarily, politically,
economically and morally. Three years of allied bombings had destroyed much of
the infrastructure, and when the Nazis unconditionally surrendered to the
Allies on May 7-8 1945 there was great debate about Germany’s long-term future.
The country was divided into four zones, each administered by the four main
victorious powers: Britain, France, the USA and the USSR. Between 1945 and 1949
relations between the USSR and the three western allies began to disintegrate
over “the issues of reparations and the western frontiers of a reconstituted
Poland.”[1]
As the USSR began to instigate social and political change in the eastern zone
of occupation, by nationalising large industries and actively supporting the Socialist
Unity Party (SED), they pulled the their zone of occupation further and further
away from the political path being undertaken by the western allies. After a
series of diplomatic crises, including the Berlin blockade of 1948-9, the GFR
was founded in May 1949, encompassing the three western occupations zones. “In
large measure as a direct response, the GDR was formally founded in the Soviet
zone a few months later, in October 1949.”[2]
Although Germany
had become officially divided, and two separate republics established, there
was still uncertainty about its long-term future. The escalation of the Cold
War throughout the 1950s destroyed any hopes of reunification in the
foreseeable future. “While in 1949 much still appeared open, by the beginning
of the 1960s patterns had been laid which were to shape the next quarter of a
century of German History.”[3]
German politicians were still very optimistic about the possibility of
reunification, many viewed the GDR as a provisional government, and that this
arrangement would “provide the basis for a government encompassing all of
Germany if the West German state was abandoned.”[4]
The constitution of the GDR was designed to be compatible with that of the GFR
although these similarities began to disappear as social and economic realities
took over. Soviet pressure on the GDR to follow their political system led to a
more centralised type of government.
The election of
Konrad Adenauer in 1949 spelled the beginning of the end for hopes of German
reunification. Adenauer was a strong supporter of a divided Germany, as he felt
that the GFR could be transformed into a “western orientated,
liberal-conservative materialistic form of ‘Chancellor Democracy’”.[5]
Adenauer would have to sacrifice the East, and hopes reaching a compromise
between East and West along lines of a democratic socialist Germany, in order
to achieve the rapid economic and political rehabilitation that Britain and the
US offered. “Adenauer supposed that the temporary division of Germany was
likely to be of long duration and that West Germany’s only hope of recovery lay
in full co-operation with the western powers.”[6]
In March 1952, in
response to negotiations between the GFR and France about the creation and
nature of a European Defence Community, Stalin sent a note that stated, “in
return for the abandonment of the West German rearmament process, he proposed a
united neutral, unoccupied Germany.”[7]
This policy pursued by Stalin was a desperate attempt to avoid the absorption
of the GFR into a western military alliance, and was a good indicator that the
USSR no longer viewed Germany as an enemy, but as a trusted partner in the
creation of “a ring of socialist brother states”.[8]
The American and British defence plans were too developed for a serious
consideration of this option, while debate between the western powers about the
order of elections and the signing of a peace treaty ensured that a compromise
would prove impossible. The USSR proposed that “the German governments would
set up a provisional all-German government to supervise the free elections, and
a reunited Germany would not belong to any alliance system”; the enforcement of
neutrality was rejected by the west, as they had plans to incorporate the GFR
into the new military alliance of NATO.[9]
The strategic
aims of both Cold War superpowers meant that neither was able to compromise
during the 1950s. The insistence of the western powers to incorporate the GFR
into their strategic military and economic alliance (NATO and the EEC), and the
insistence on behalf of the USSR to ensure that the GDR would either be
neutral, or a strong ally, were completely incompatible. When once last attempt
was made to discuss reunification in January 1954 it was suspected that this
was only a propaganda stunt on behalf of the USSR. In 1953 they had shown how
strongly they wished to hold onto the GDR as a close ally, by crushing protests
against the GDR government wish Soviet tanks. When sovereignty was granted to
the GDR later in 1954, and the foundation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the last
steps had been taken in dividing Germany and Europe into two separate camps.
“By the close of the 1950s the four powers had abandoned hope of reunification
in the near future.”[10]
Obviously, given
the political circumstances of the 1950s, any notion of reuniting Germany had
been extremely optimistic. Throughout the next 40 years the partition of
Germany became the main front of the Cold War, and led to the development of
two completely different political and economic systems. “Both sides had
consolidated the division by the institutional embedding of the two partial
states into very different systems and spheres of influence.”[11]
However this system began to unravel in the late 1980s, as Eastern Europe was
shaken by a series of revolutions. These started in Poland and Hungary, before
spreading to the GDR and Czechoslovakia and heralded the collapse of the Iron
Curtain, the division of Europe and Germany, and eventually the Cold War
itself. It is an essential question to ask ‘what had changed from the 1950s,
when the Cold War had inevitably torn Germany apart; to the 1980s, when
communist East Europe collapsed leading to an effective take-over of the GDR by
the GFR.
The most crucial
change has to be that of Soviet foreign policy, in the 1950s the USSR had used
its military strength to suppress the 1953 rebellion, and had ensured that the
GDR became one of its closest allies. This change began in March 1985, when
Mikhael Gorbachev became leader of the USSR, in inherited “an ailing economy
burdened by high defence spending, a world role it could no longer sustain, and
political troubles at home.”[12]
In response Gorbachev embarked on a radically different domestic and foreign
policy that clearly aspired “to end the Cold War, encourage the rise of legitimate
reformers in Eastern Europe through a policy of non-interference in their
affairs, and reintegrate the Soviet Union into the international system as a
trusted partner.”[13]
This was a necessary adaptation by Gorbachev, as by the 1970s the whole ‘alternate
system’ myth was starting to crumble. The USSR was increasingly reliant on
grain imports and foreign technology to keep its economy functioning.
However,
there is no evidence that Gorbachev’s reforms sought to bring Germany back
together. The so-called ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ of ‘letting them do it their way’
meant that the German people had to decide their own future. This proved to be
the catalyst for the collapse of the GDR as East Germans, aware of higher
prosperity in the west, began to emigrate in their masses. This process was
greatly helped by changes in Hungarian foreign policy, which lead to a
dismantling of the Iron Curtain and a flood of East German migrants to the GFR
via Austria. The mass emigration meant that “increasing pressure was exerted on
the regime to enter into a dialogue, to deal with the real issues and bases of
unrest, and to introduce some degree of democratisation and liberalisation so
that people would feel it was worthwhile to stay and work for change within the
GDR.”[14]
In response the GDR government gambled that freedom to travel would meet the
demands of the public, and would ensure the survival of a separate, distinctly
democratic socialist GDR. However this gamble backfired spectacularly, the
resulting stampede westwards, and the economic strain this placed on both GDR
and GFR economies meant that the crisis could only be solved by reunification.
The Soviet role in these events had been one of non-interference, and although
it might have been highly possible for the Soviet regime to crush the
revolutionaries, this contradicted with Gorbachev’s policy of reform and
liberalisation so no action was taken.
The
subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall, and disintegration of the GDR meant that
there was “clearly no alternative to an equalisation of living conditions and
an integration of the economies of the two Germanys – and this inevitably
implied political unification.”[15]
The Deutchmark was introduced in the GDR shortly after the fall of ‘the Wall’
in November 1989; this move resulted in even Gorbachev and GDR Prime Minister
Hans Modrow accepting that German unification was necessary, and that it should
happen sooner rather than later. Officially reunification occurred on October 3
1990, and Germany entered a new stage in its tumultuous history. “Thus by the
end of 1990, the ‘post war period’ – the division of Europe and the world
between the superpowers, which had been inaugurated by a Second World War
launched from German soil – had finally come to an end.”[16]
The role that the Cold War played in the
division and reunification of Germany cannot be underestimated as many
historians have found it incredibly difficult to imagine a Cold War without a
separated Germany; or a separated Germany without a Cold War. Any attempts
during the 1950s at reunification were thwarted by the main superpowers, the US
and Britain on one side and the USSR on the other, who were completely
unwilling to compromise the security that a divided Germany offered them in
return for reunification. The eventual ‘take-over’ of the GDR by the GFR in
1990 would have been completely unacceptable for the USSR in the 1950s.
Therefore the crucial change in the situation between the 1950s and the 1990s
can be seen as the attitude of the USSR, and Gorbachev’s policies of non-interference
and reform. As had been the case in 1945, it was foreign powers who dictated
Germany’s path throughout the fall of the GDR, and it was the choice of the
foreign powers to allow German reunification in 1990, whereas they had not
allowed it in the 1950s.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Carr, William. A History of Germany
1815-1990, New York, 1991.
Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of
Germany, Cambridge, 1990.
Fulbrook, Mary. The Fontana History of
Germany: 1918-1990 the divided nation, London, 1991.
Merkl, Peter H. German Unification in the
European Context, Pennsylvania, 1993.
Turner, Henry Ashby Jr., Germany from
Partition to Reunification, New Haven, 1992.
Zelikow, Philip and Rice, Condoleezza. Germany
Unified and Europe Transformed: a study in statecraft, Harvard, 1995.