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A workers’ revolt; a mutiny of peasant soldiers; a political revolution? Which of these best describes the February revolution, and why did the Tsarist system fall in February 1917?
The Russian revolution of February 1917 was a momentous event in the course of Russian history. Its causes, nature and effect are complex and critical in the analysis of twentieth century international history. The revolution began in Petrograd as a workers’ revolt in response to bread shortages, and was aimed at the Tsarist system because it was believed that the government was hoarding the bread in order to drive up prices. However a workers’ revolt, by itself, is very unlikely to result in the abdication of the Tsar, and a critical phase of the revolution was the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison, and the loss of control over Petrograd that the Tsar experienced. Marxist historians have grossly exaggerated the extent of political involvement in the revolution, and it would be fair to say that only at a very late stage of the revolution did socialist political parties become involved. The Tsarist system fell for many reasons: the war against Germany meant that troops could not be deployed in force against the revolutionaries; the Tsar underestimated the extent of the revolts in Petrograd until it was too late; and the Tsar was convinced by his generals that only the Duma could deal with the situation. All of these events were necessary to bring down an autocratic system centuries old, and deeply connected with the mentality of the Russian people.
The revolution began as a peaceful bread protest on International Womens’ Day. There was a bread shortage not because the harvest was low, (even though there had been a significant decline in the peasant population, this had been counter-balanced by exports rapidly decreasing due to the German naval blockade) but because the “railway system had become overloaded due to the war, and was unable to supply the northern cities with grain.” In mid-February it was felt that “only ten days supply of flour remained in Petrograd”. Skilled labourers had been recruited by the army while the rail network had been divided into sections, controlled by civil government and by the military. This, as well as the general belief that the government was hoarding bread in order to drive up prices, meant that the anger of the demonstration was not directed against the peasants for being incapable of producing enough food, but was aimed against the Tsarist regime because of its inability to distribute this food. The frustrated townspeople began to transform into an unruly mob because “their protest had the support of demonstrations by the more militant Petrograd factory workers.” Textile labourers, as well as workers in the Putilov steel works, went on strike, and the crowds swelled from 100,000 on the first day on protest (February 23), to over 200,000 three days later.
However it would not be true to describe the protests as purely a ‘workers revolt’ because “it bore the character of a general uprising of the people” according to Balk, a contemporary. The majority of the people involved in the revolt were more likely to be spectators who would cheer mutinous soldiers. But it would be fair to say that the workers played a “leading role in the demonstrations” and were especially active in the violent aspects of the uprising. In general however, the protest took the form of a peasant riot, as acts of violence from the crowds became commonplace.
To transform a mass-demonstration into a revolution required more than just workers protesting in the streets; it required a loss of authority for the government in the city of Petrograd. This occurred as a result of the mutiny of troops from the Petrograd garrison in response to a massacre “in Znamenskii Square, a popular gathering place for political rallies, where troops of the Pavlovskii Guard Regiment fired upon a crowd that failed to disperse.” About forty civilians were killed in the massacre which enraged members of the Petrograd garrison into mutiny as it was felt their “mothers and sisters were being shot” by the police and the Cossacks. But even though there had been a major power transfer to the workers, a revolution was hardly inevitable as the mutineers were described as a “leaderless rabble, who when threatened, instantly panicked and ran for cover.” It was inaction from the Tsar that transformed a minor rebellion into a revolution.
The revolt also needed organisation if it was to be successful. Unfortunately for the political parties that had most to gain from the revolt, many of their leaders were in exile. Most of the socialist parties had no expectation of a revolution, as Lenin had predicted in January that “we older men perhaps will not live to see the coming revolution.” Even Sergei Mstislavsky, a Social Revolutionary leader, admitted “the revolution found us, the party members, in our sleep.” So there was relatively little political involvement in the early stages of the February revolution, especially from socialist parties. The lack of organisation was characterised by political parties having to telephone each other in order to find out what was happening on the streets. Because of this complete disorganisation of the socialist political parties it would be very premature to describe the February 1917 revolution as a ‘political revolution’. There was also very little confidence from the political parties that the protests had any political nature at all. The Bolshevik leader in Petrograd, Schliapnikov, felt that “once the crowd got their bread they would be content and disperse.”
It seemed as though the Tsar had the same opinion about the inevitable failure of the protests actually transforming into a revolution. He initially responded to reports from Petrograd by telling his Minister of the Courts that “the fat-bellied Rodzianko has written me a lot of nonsense, which I won’t even bother to answer.” However he heard that the protests were getting worse, and that the Petrograd garrison had mutinied, so on February 28th he ordered the Duma should be dissolved and that troops be deployed against the protestors. In response the Duma created the Ispolkom (executive committee), while the soldiers and workers formed a Soviet which became a rival power-base to the Duma, situated in the left wing of Tauride Palace. The Soviet had the power in the streets, but no legal authority to rule, while the Duma had the legal authority to rule, but no power in the streets to support it. Therefore “the provisional government (the Duma) has no real power and its orders are carried out only to the extent permitted by the Soviet.” The late reaction by the Tsar to the protests meant that a power base had been created in the Soviet, which could never co-operate with the autocratic system. Full revolution or full military suppression by already stretched armies were now the only two possible outcomes.
The war with Germany made the second of the two options a near impossibility; to withdraw troops from the front in order to suppress the revolutionaries would result in almost certain defeat at the hands of the Germans. But the Tsar decided to appoint General Ivanov to send troops to Petrograd and restore order in the capital. Both Ivanov and the Tsar had under-estimated the extent of the revolutionary action in the city, and this was confirmed once Ivanov had consulted General Khabalov in Petrograd about the situation. Khabalov announced that “the whole city was in the hands of the revolutionaries” and that “the ministers had been arrested by the revolutionaries”. Upon hearing this terrible news Ivanov decided that the offensive would be futile and decided against it. In effect the decision had now been made, and there was little opportunity for the Tsar to do anything but abdicate.
This was confirmed by Rodzianko, who felt that “nothing short of the Tsar’s abdication would pacify the rebellious troops.” A continuation of strikes and mutinies may have led to supplies to the front being cut; it was also feared that turmoil in the capital might spread to the front only a few hundred kilometres away, leading to mass desertion in the army. Therefore the Tsar’s generals advised Nicholas to abdicate in order to save Russia’s war effort, and to somehow satisfy the mutineers in Petrograd. So he agreed to abdicate and initially named his son, Alexis, as his successor. But when it was discovered that Alexis’ haemophilia was not cured, as had been promised by Rasputin, Nicholas decided to hand the autocracy to his brother, Mikhail. When Mikhail learned that the Soviet was violently opposed to the continuation of the Romanov dynasty, he refused to accept, and the autocratic rule of the Tsar in Russia ended.
The February revolution began as a general uprising of the people, of which the workers were the most important and most active part. The sympathy and eventual mutiny of peasant soldiers led to power being wrested from the hands of the Tsar, and transferring to the Soviet and the Duma. The political involvement of socialist parties has been consistently overestimated, and political involvement of any sort was only evident later in the revolt. Therefore it would be premature, and potentially a falsehood, to describe the February revolution as a ‘political revolution’. A series of bad judgements by the Tsar, underestimating the extent of the revolution, as well as the impact of the war, limited his ability to suppress the revolution. When his attempts to restore order in Petrograd failed, he was advised to abdicate, and did so on March 3rd 1917, ending over three hundred years of Romanov rule in Russia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Carmichael, Joel. A Short History of the Russian Revolution, London, 1966.
Ferro, Marc. The Russian Revolution of February 1917, London, 1972.
Figes, Orlando. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, New York, 1996.
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